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ABSTRACT 
 
We show that banking crises have an important effect on income distribution: inequality 
increases before banking crisis episodes and sharply decline afterwards. We also find that, 
while a large government size does not per se seem to reduce inequality, a rise in financial 
depth (i.e. better access to credit provided by the banking sector) contributes to a more 
equal distribution of income. 
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1. Introduction 
How does income inequality change in the outcome of a banking crisis? From a 
theoretical point of view, financial crises can lead to bankruptcies and falls in asset prices, 
generate deep recessions and demand policy responses such as bailouts, but their effects on 
inequality are not clear (Atkinson and Morelli, 2011). From an empirical perspective, the 
1929 crash was followed by a substantial correction in inequality, because wealth losses 
and financial reforms hit the top of income distribution. In contrast, the most recent 
turmoil witnessed a slight fall in income gap, but no clear trend on how it will evolve in 
the future.  
Freeman (2010) finds that inequality increases dramatically before financial crises.  
Similarly, a number of authors analyze the link between income inequality, household debt 
leverage, and financial crises and emphasize that the role of credit demand (Rajan, 2010; 
Reich, 2010) or credit supply (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010; Levitin and Wachter, 2010) in 
explaining the high debt levels of households at the bottom of income distribution. 
Hubbard (2010) argues that policymakers appear to be responsible for the latest crises.1  
Moss (2009) investigates whether huge income gaps create ³ZURQJ´incentives that 
increase the vulnerability of the financial system. Stiglitz (2009) suggests that the 
combination of stagnant real incomes and increased borrowing by low income households 
leads to an unsustainable path that makes default and financial crises more likely. Blair 
(2010) shows that, because asset bubbles typically lead to higher returns, the banking 
system has the potential to generate highly leveraged systems and increase inequality. 
In this paper, we find that income inequality significantly increases at the onset of a 
banking crises and declines afterwards. In addition, while, for OECD countries, the 
distributional effects of banking crises over income occur after the event and reduce 
inequality, Non-OECD countries observe a significant rise in inequality before the onset of 
the crisis. 
We also show that the government size does not per se reduce inequality, which 
casts some doubts about the redistributive effects of fiscal policy, in particular, for OECD 
countries. 
Interestingly, in OECD countries, a better access to credit from the banking sector 
helps achieving a reduction in inequality. However, households at the top of the income 
distribution seem to have been favoured in richer countries. 
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 Other authors look at the impact of foreign direct inestment (Choi, 2006) or globailization (Lee, 2010) on 
inequality.  
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2. Econometric Framework 
We estimate the following dynamic panel data model: 
 
    itiACjitCitBCjitititit tDDDGiniGini HOGJJJU   32111 'Xく             (1) 
 
for L «1W  «7i , where Giniit is the Gini inequality index for country i at time t 
and X is a set of control variables including government size, income per capita, financial 
depth (i.e. domestic credit provided by the banking sector in percentage of GDP) and 
unemployment rate. BCjitD  , 
C
itD  and  
AC
jitD   are dummy variables that take the value of one 
for all t - j periods before the banking crisis (BC), during the entire period of the banking 
crisis (C) and for all t +  j periods after the banking crisis (AC), respectively, and zero 
otherwise. Finally iG  and O  account for country-specific and time effects, respectively, 
and itH  is an i.i.d. error term. 
Given that the distributional effects associated with banking crises may occur with 
some lags, we consider different time horizons (j =  1, « 5). In addition, to avoid any 
indeterminacy, all the observations where pre- or post-crisis periods partially or fully 
overlap with previous or future crisis episodes are dropped from the analysis. 
Model (1) is estimated using Instrumental Variables ± Generalized Method of 
Moments (IV-GMM) techniques. We instrument Gini coefficient index, income per capita 
and government size with their lags. Financial depth and unemployment rate are assumed 
to be exogenous.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Results 
We use annual data for 62 OECD and non-OECD countries and the sample period 
is 1980-2006. 
Gini inequality index data comes from the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID).2 Banking crises episodes are identified as in Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010). 
Data for government size, income per capita, financial depth and unemployment 
rate are provided by the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
Table 1 summarizes the results for the full sample. We show that income inequality 
rises some periods before a banking crisis and declines afterwards. The effects are 
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statistically significant and typically larger one year before and after the crisis. This is 
corroborated by the coefficients associated with BCitD 1  (0.307) and ACitD 1  (-0.320). 
Inequality is a very persistent variable, which reflects that changes in the income 
distribution within the country do not often occur. 
We do not find a significant effect of government size on income inequality. While 
Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) show that redistribution by the government leads to a 
reduction of disparities, Krugman (2008) argues that inequality is primarily the result of 
political change in the form of rising polarization. This suggests that broad fiscal policies 
do not per se reduce inequality. 
Income per capita has a positive and significant impact on income inequality, 
although the magnitude of the effect is very small. This can be linked to the higher wealth 
inequality driven by the poor performance of middle class families and those at the bottom 
of the income distribution in rich countries (Kumhof and Rancière, 2010). 
A fall in unemployment and an ease of the access to credit from the banking sector 
allows households in the low-end of the income distribution to borrow and achieve higher 
living standards. As a result, inequality is reduced. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
In Tables 2 and 3, we replicate the estimation of model (1) for developed (OECD) 
and developing (Non-OECD) countries. An interesting difference between the two groups 
emerges: while, for OECD countries, inequality significantly drops after a banking crisis, 
Non-OECD countries experience a rise in inequality before the crisis. 
For OECD countries, a rise in the government size exacerbates income inequality, 
in line with the perception of a lack of soundness in fiscal policies. As for financial depth, 
this variable is particularly relevant and effective in reducing income gaps. For Non-
OECD countries, neither the government size nor financial depth is statistically significant, 
which largely reflects the dysfunctionalities of credit markets. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
[Table 3] 
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4. Conclusion 
This paper shows that income gaps rise before banking crisis episodes and sharply 
falls afterwards. Moreover, inequality: (i) is not per se reduced by a large government size; 
and (ii) diminishes with the rise in financial depth. 
Some authors argue that the lack of government regulation increased the debt 
leverage for the group at the bottom of income distribution and boosted the vulnerability to 
financial crises (Kumhof and Rancière, 2010). 
From a policy perspective, this would demand more regulation and tax and social 
policies aimed at shortening the disparities between the poor and the rich.  We plan to 
explore this research avenue in the future. 
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